Individual Upper Semicontinuity and Subgame Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Games with Almost Perfect Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Subgame Perfect Implementation With Almost Perfect Information
The theory of incomplete contracts has been recently questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of this mechanism to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. Our main result is that the mechanism may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation as the amount of asymmetric information...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3318410