Individual payments as a longer-term incentive in online panels
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Individual payments as a longer-term incentive in online panels.
Does it pay to pay online panel members? A three-wave longitudinal experiment was conducted with an online panel to examine whether per person payments, paid through an online intermediary, influence response and retention rates. In the payment condition, participants were promised payment for participation at each wave, whereas control participants were not offered any payment. The promise of ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Behavior Research Methods
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1554-351X,1554-3528
DOI: 10.3758/brm.40.4.1144