Individual manipulability of majoritarian rules for one-dimensional preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Procedia Computer Science
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1877-0509
DOI: 10.1016/j.procs.2018.10.252