Individual characteristics and behavior in repeated games: an experimental study
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Adaptation and convergence of behavior in repeated experimental Cournot games
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1386-4157,1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-014-9427-7