Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis
Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale. Furthermore, there exist alternative bid procedures that, in theory at least, guarantee 100% effic...
متن کاملA Theory of Indicative Bidding∗
When selling a business by auction, sellers typically use indicative bids – non-binding preliminary bids – to select a small number of bidders to conduct due diligence and submit binding offers. We show that if entry into the auction is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly-increasing strategies, with bidders “pooling” over a finite number of bids. T...
متن کاملIndicative Bidding in Auctions with Costly Entry∗
When selling a business by auction, investment banks frequently use indicative bids – non-binding preliminary bids – to select a limited number of bidders to participate. We show that if participation is costly, indicative bids can be informative: symmetric equilibrium exists in weakly-increasing strategies, but bidders “pool” over a finite number of bids, so the highest-value bidders are not a...
متن کاملAn Experimental Analysis of Late-Bidding in Internet Auctions
A great deal of late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as eBay, which employ a second price auction with a fixed deadline. Much less late bidding has been observed on internet auctions such as those run by Amazon, which employ similar auction rules, but use an ending rule that automatically extends the auction if necessary after the scheduled close until ten minutes have passe...
متن کاملAscending Prices and Package Bidding: An Experimental Analysis
We use theory and experiment to explore the effectiveness of price-guided mechanisms to assign resources in package allocation problems. Two mechanisms are tested: the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) of Porter, Rassenti, Roopnarine, and Smith (2003) and a matched version of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), similar to designs currently in use for spectrum and electricity sales. Unlike...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.005