Independent executive directors: How distraction affects their advisory and monitoring roles

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Corporate Finance

سال: 2019

ISSN: 0929-1199

DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.02.003