INDEFENSIBLE MIDDLE GROUND FOR LOCAL REDUCTIONISM ABOUT TESTIMONY
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Indefensible Middle Ground for Local Reductionism about Testimony
Local reductionism purports to defend a middle ground in the debate about the epistemic status of testimony-based beliefs. It does so by acknowledging the practical ineliminability of testimony as a source of knowledge, while insisting that such an acknowledgment need not entail a default-acceptance view, according to which there exists an irreducible warrant for accepting testimony. The presen...
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Tony Coady's book Testimony is about how we gain knowledge from other people, through learning from their spoken and written reports and other tellings. Several major philosophers, including John Locke, David Hume, Thomas Reid, and Bertrand Russell, have written more briefly on "testimony" in this broad sense (Coady's historical chapters provide us with helpful critical accounts of their views)...
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Almost everyone agrees that many testimonial beliefs constitute knowledge. According to non-reductionists, some testimonial beliefs possess positive epistemic status independent of that conferred by perception, memory, and induction. Recently, Jennifer Lackey has provided a counterexample to a popular version of this view. Here I argue that her counterexample fails.
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Two key intuitions regarding knowledge are explored: that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement and tha t knowledge excludes luck. It is claimed that a proper understanding of how these intuitions should inform our conception of knowledge leads to some surprising results, not just as regards the theory of knowledge more generally but also as regards the epistemology of testimonial knowle...
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§0 Introduction By far the most central and important question about laws of nature is this: Are they mere patterns in the phenomena (patterns that are in some way salient, to be sure—but still, nothing more than patterns)? Or are they something more, something that somehow governs or constrains those phenomena? Disagreement over this issue constitutes the Schism in contemporary philosophical w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Ratio
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0034-0006,1467-9329
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00424.x