Inconspicuousness and obfuscation: how large shareholders dynamically manipulate output and information for trading purposes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Finance
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1614-2446,1614-2454
DOI: 10.1007/s10436-018-0334-3