Incomplete‐information games in large populations with anonymity

Anonymity in Nonatomic Games

Anonymity in large societies

We formalize the notion of coalition measure as a primitive of social choice with a countably infinite number of agents. An example would be a dynamic setting with an infinite horizon, where it may be convenient to consider separately each individual’s preferences at every moment of time. In this setting, there are some “equal size” coalitions that a social choice rule should treat in the same ...

Exploring anonymity in cooperative board games

This study was done as a part of a larger research project where the interest was on exploring if and how gameplay design could give informative principles to the design of educational activities. The researchers conducted a series of studies trying to map game mechanics that had the special quality of being inclusive, i.e., playable by a diverse group of players. This specific study focused on...

Extensive-form games with heterogeneous populations

The adoption of Nash equilibrium (NE) in real–world settings is often impractical due to its too restrictive assumptions. Game theory and artificial intelligence provide alternative solution concepts. When knowledge about opponents utilities and types is not available, the appropriate solution concept for extensive–form games is the self–confirming equilibrium (SCE), which relaxes NE allowing a...

Large Distributional Games with Traits∗

A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT ) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012 a and b), and in this paper, we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT ). In addition to a generalization of work initiated and advocated by Mas-Colell (1984), we delineate the role of saturated spaces, as...