Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods ¬リニ
We study the provision of an excludable public good to discuss whether the imposition of participation constraints is desirable. It is shown that this question may equivalently be cast as follows: should a firm that produces a public good receive tax revenues, or face a self-financing requirement. The main result is that the desirability of participation constraints is shaped by an equity-effic...
متن کاملSimple Subscription Mechanisms for Excludable Public Goods
For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to uniquely implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-i...
متن کاملThe provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus bundling
This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism design and the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the nal allocation of private-good...
متن کاملNon-excludable public good experiments
We conduct a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the second stage, knowing the other subject’s commitment decision, subjects who did not commit in the first stage choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the ...
متن کاملAn experimental comparison of collective choice procedures for excludable public goods
This paper compares three collective choice procedures for the provision of excludable public goods under incomplete information. One, serial cost sharing (SCS), is budget balanced, individually rational, anonymous and strategy proof. The other two are bhybridQ procedures: voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates (PCS) and with no rebates (NR). PCS satisfies all these properties except ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.028