Incomplete contract, bargaining and optimal divisional structure

Bargaining Power and Contract Design

Over the past 40 years, an irrelevance proposition has been embraced implicitly in law-andeconomics scholarship: bargaining power should affect only price and not non-price terms of a contract. This proposition is based on unstated assumptions that contracting is affected by neither transaction costs nor asymmetrical information and that the parties are risk neutral. In contrast, practitioners ...

Functional Vs Divisional Structure

Product Leadership: A product has several components, the inner components that craft the product, the external components like sales, marketing, inventory, procurement, customer service etc. The product leadership defines the features and functionalities of the product, the roadmap and timelines of the product delivery & its deployment. Product leadership needs to be very well connected to the...

Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information∗

This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues such as the appropriate game form, existence and uniqueness of equilibria are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework.

Bargaining under Incomplete Information

Bargaining Theory and Royalty Contract Negotiations

This article shows how the principles of modern bargaining theory can help develop a better understanding of contractual terms such as royalties between copyright holders and users such as between an artist and a recording company (or between an author and a publisher). We develop the main principles in a non-technical and illustrative manner.