Incomplete and Asymmetric Surplus Information in Labor Relations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incomplete and Asymmetric Surplus Information in Labor Relations
Numerous laboratory experiments show that workers reciprocate to high wages with high effort, when there is perfect information on the surplus created. Recent field experiments, however, suggest that trust and reciprocity may be lower – or absent – when the information is incomplete. We report a laboratory experiment with symmetric and asymmetric incomplete surplus information in a “bilateral g...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.556958