Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives
This paper shows that politicians may not offer to provide a socially desirable public good because the benefits of the public good cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending. We present a Downsian model where candidates care only about the spoils of office. We compare a winner-take-all system, where all the spoils go to the winner, to a proportional system, where the spoils...
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The problem of incentives has arisen in a number of economic contexts, including most recently as a general issue in the design and analysis of resource allocation mechanisms [c.f. Hurwicz (1973)]. Most simply, the incentive problem concerns the rationale there is (or can be provided) for economic agents to follow prescribed rules of behavior designed to achieve some objective, usually an effic...
متن کاملIncentives for Public Disclosure by Corporate Insiders†
It is well understood that when corporate insiders trade shares in their firms stock for the sole purpose of maximizing trading profits, they benefit from asymmetric information, and consequently, favor minimal corporate financial disclosure requirements. We demonstrate that when insiders are risk-averse and have other motives for trade, such as liquidity needs, they can actually be harmed by a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Choice
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0048-5829,1573-7101
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9578-9