Incentive Structures Maximizing Residual Gain under Incomplete Information

Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core

We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts. While communication of private information is permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by incentive compatibility constraints. We formalize a notion of the core for such an economy. Our analysis can...

Bargaining under Incomplete Information

Incentive information sharing in various market structures

Available online 17 March 2015

Skill Formation under Incomplete Information

We consider an economic model of child development with multiple stages. Due to incomplete information, parents are not able to tailor their investments to their child's type when the child is young. We show that incomplete information weakens the importance of early investments in children when inter-stage investments are easily substitutable, but strengthens them when substitution is difficul...

Hedging Demands under Incomplete Information

I present a model of consumption and portfolio choice under market incompleteness and imperfect information regarding the investment opportunity set. I solve analytically the consumption and portfolio choice problem for an investor learning about the true state of the economy. When prices are the only observations, the previously unspanned state variables are spanned by the market securities un...