Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds

Information acquisition and mutual funds

We generalize the standard competitive rational expectations equilibrium (Hellwig (1980), Verrecchia (1982)) by studying the possibility that informed agents open mutual funds in order to sell their private information. We illustrate how mutual funds endogenously arise in equilibrium and we characterize the fund managers’ optimal investment management fees under imperfect competition. In our mo...

Mutual Funds in Equilibrium∗

Historically, the literature on money management has not consistently applied the rational expectations equilibrium concept. We explain why and summarize recent developments in the money management literature that do apply this concept correctly. We demonstrate that in many respects the rational expectations equilibrium better approximates the observed equilibrium in the money management space ...

Mutual Funds by Edwin

Essays on Mutual Funds

Title of dissertation: ESSAYS ON MUTUAL FUNDS Nitin Kumar, Doctor of Philosophy, 2013 Dissertation directed by: Professor Russ Wermers Department of Finance Robert H. Smith School of Business This dissertation comprises of three essays on mutual funds. In the first essay, I test whether fund investors rationally incorporate portfolio manager ownership disclosure in their portfolio allocation de...

Categorizing Mutual Funds Using Clusters

We classify mutual funds using cluster analysis and examine whether the categories created by clusters are the same as those assigned by the invest ment objectives Since mutual funds are usually classi ed based on their investment objectives clustering funds based on their nancial characteris tics rather than their investment objectives could explain why some mutual funds do not perform accordi...