Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
Deadlines and penalties are widely used to incentivize effort. We model how these incentive contracts affect the work rate and time taken in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on Minnesota highway construction contracts that includes day-by-day information on work plans, hours actually worked and delays, we find evidence of moral haza...
متن کاملPrivate Contracts in Two-sided Markets
We study a two-sided market in which a platform mediates between sellers and buyers, and signs private contracts with sellers. We compare this market with (i) a one-sided market with public contracts, and (ii) a two-sided market with public contracts. We find that equilibrium royalties can be positive or negative in a one-sided market with public contracts, are negative in a twosided market wit...
متن کاملNash-Implementation in Two-Sided Matching with Substitutable Contracts
I examine two types of mechanisms, demand revelation mechanisms and preference revelation mechanisms, in many-to-one matching problems. As in Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), I consider general matching problems with contracts. I show that the core correspondence is not Nash-implementable by any demand/preference revelation mechanism. A strong version of Maskin monotonicity plays a crucial role for...
متن کاملMoral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents
We investigate the effects of contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after the agents observe a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. We show that renegotiation with multiple agents reduces the cost of implementing any implementable action profile down to the first-best level, even though the princ...
متن کاملDynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
A group of risk-averse agents repeatedly produce a perishable consumption good; individual outputs are observable but efforts are not. The contracting problem admits a recursive formulation, and the optimal value function is the fixed point of a contraction mapping. When the agents can be punished to the full extent in a single period, every continuation contract of an optimal contract is itsel...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.2253