Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sharing risk through concession contracts
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
سال: 2017
ISSN: 8756-6222,1465-7341
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewx014