منابع مشابه
Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets
We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which induce ordinal preferences over match partners. We show that most agents in large matching markets are close to being indifferent overall stable matchings. In oneto-one matching, the utility gain by manipulating a stable mec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00023-1