Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core
We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts. While communication of private information is permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by incentive compatibility constraints. We formalize a notion of the core for such an economy. Our analysis can...
متن کاملInformational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information
We study the ex ante incentive compatible core, and provide conditions under which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002a, Econometrica, 70, 2421–2453). 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C71; D51; D82
متن کاملMonotonicity and Incentive Compatibility
Understanding multi-dimensional mechanism design. 1 The Model Let M = {1, . . . , m} be a finite set of agents. Every agent has private information, which can be multi-dimensional. This is called his type. The space from which an agent draws his type is called his type space. Let Ti denote the type space of agent i ∈ M . We assume Ti ⊆ R n for some integer n ≥ 1. Let T m = ×mi=1Ti. Also, denote...
متن کاملDynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Profit Maximization and Information Disclosure
This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive-compatible mechanisms in environments in which the agentsprivate information evolves stochastically over time and in which decisions have to be made in each period. The environments we consider are fairly general in that the agents types are allowed to evolve in a non-Markov way, decisions are allowed to a¤ect the type distributions a...
متن کاملDynamic Mechanism Design: Incentive Compatibility, Prot Maximization and Information Disclosure
We examine the design of incentive-compatible screening mechanisms for dynamic environments in which the agentstypes follow a (possibly non-Markov) stochastic process, decisions may be made over time and may a¤ect the type process, and payo¤s need not be time-separable. We derive a formula for the derivative of an agents equilibrium payo¤ with respect to his current type in an incentive-compa...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1978
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(78)90047-9