منابع مشابه
Inapproximability of NP-Complete Variants of Nash Equilibrium
In recent work of Hazan and Krauthgamer (SICOMP 2011), it was shown that finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium with near-optimal value in a two-player game is as hard as finding a hidden clique of size O(logn) in the random graph G(n,1/2). This raises the question of whether a similar intractability holds for approximate Nash equilibrium without side constraints such as high value. We give ...
متن کاملInapproximability Results for Approximate Nash Equilibria
We study the problem of finding approximate Nash equilibria that satisfy certain conditions, such as providing good social welfare. In particular, we study the problem ǫ-NE δ-SW: find an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE) that is within δ of the best social welfare achievable by an ǫ-NE. Our main result is that, if the randomized exponential-time hypothesis (RETH) is true, then solving ( 1 8...
متن کاملNash equilibrium
In game theory, Nash equilibrium (named after John Forbes Nash, who proposed it) is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or...
متن کاملRefinements of Nash Equilibrium
In game theory, “refinement” refers to the selection of a subset of equilibria, typically on the grounds that the selected equilibria are more plausible than other equilibria. These notes are a brief, largely informal, survey of some of the most heavily used refinements. Throughout, “equilibria” means Nash equilibria (NE), unless I state otherwise explicitly. And throughout, I assume that the g...
متن کاملCorrelated Nash equilibrium
We modify the epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium only to accommodate Gilboa and Schmeidler’s [Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18 (1989), 141–153] maxmin expected utility preferences, and identify the equilibrium concept in n-player strategic games that characterizes the modified epistemic conditions. The epistemic characterization supports the equilibrium concept as a minimal generali...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SIAM Journal on Computing
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0097-5397,1095-7111
DOI: 10.1137/15m1039274