In defence of revealed preference theory

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

General revealed preference theory

We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences) are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result “explains” classical revealed preference th...

متن کامل

Revealed Preference Theory

Pioneered by American economist Paul Samuelson, revealed preference theory is based on the idea that the preferences of consumers are revealed in their purchasing behavior. Researchers in this field have developed complex and sophisticated mathematical models to capture the preferences that are “revealed” through consumer choice behavior. This study of consumer demand and behavior is closely ti...

متن کامل

Revealed Preference in Game Theory

I characterize joint choice behavior generated by the pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution concept by an extension of the Congruence Axiom of Richter(1966) to multiple agents. At the same time, I relax the “complete domain” assumption of Yanovskaya(1980) and Sprumont(2000) to “closed domain.” Without any restrictions on the domain of the choice correspondence, determining pure strategy Nash ...

متن کامل

The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing Tastes†

We analyze preferences over finite decision problems in order to model decision-makers with “changing tastes”. We provide conditions on these preferences that identify the Strotz model of consistent planning. Building on an example by Peleg and Yaari (1973), we show that for problems with infinitely many choices, Strotz’s representation of preferences may not be well-defined. For that case, we ...

متن کامل

A revealed-preference theory of strategic counterfactuals

The analysis of extensive-form games involves assumptions concerning players’ beliefs at histories off the predicted path of play. However, the revealed-preference interpretation of such assumptions is unclear: how does one elicit probabilities conditional upon events that have zero ex-ante probability? This paper addresses this issue by proposing and axiomatizing a novel choice criterion for a...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Economics and Philosophy

سال: 2020

ISSN: 0266-2671,1474-0028

DOI: 10.1017/s0266267120000073