Impulse balance and framing effects in threshold public good games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study
A discrete public good is provided when total contributions equal or exceed the contribution threshold. Recent theoretical work shows that an increase in threshold uncertainty will increase (decrease) equilibrium contributions when the public good value is sufficiently high (low). In an experiment designed to test these predictions, I find only limited verification of the prediction. Using elic...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12359