Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy, and Training
نویسندگان
چکیده
Management matters for firms, but what practices are optimal in hierarchical government organizations? And can skilled managers identify them? A large-scale randomized trial conducted with the police of Rajasthan, India, tested four interventions recommended by senior officers: limitations transfers, rotation duties and days off, increased community involvement, on-duty training. Field experience motivated a fifth intervention: “decoy” visits enumerators to register cases, incentivizing staff improve service. Only training decoy had robust impacts; others were poorly implemented ineffective. reforms policing, even leaders struggle interventions. (JEL H76, J24, J45, K42, M53, O17)
منابع مشابه
Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy and Training∗
The role of good management practices in organizations has recently been emphasized. Do the same principles also apply in government organizations, even the most bureaucratic and hierarchical of them? And can skilled, motivated managers identify how to improve these practices, or is there a role for outsiders to help them in this task? Two unique large-scale randomized trials conducted in colla...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1945-7731', '1945-774X', '1945-7812']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20190664