Impossibilities for Strategy-Proof Committee Selection Mechanisms with Vetoes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A sequential selection game with vetoes
We study an on-line selection game between two committee members (the players). The committee interviews candidates sequentially and has to decide, after each interview, whether to hire or to interview the next candidate.. Each player can either accept or reject the candidate, and if he rejects the candidate while the other accepts her, he can cast a veto. The candidate is hired if accepted by ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2818678