منابع مشابه
Coordination with Rational Inattention
We study information acquisition in a coordination game with incomplete information. To capture the idea that players can exibly decide what information to acquire, we do not impose any physical restriction on feasible information structure. Facing an informational cost measured by reduction of Shannon's entropy, players collect information most relevant to their welfare and are rationally inat...
متن کاملSignal Extraction and Rational Inattention∗
In this paper we examine the implications of two theories of informational frictions, signal extraction (SE) and rational inattention (RI), for optimal decisions and economic dynamics within the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) setting. We first show that if the variance of the noise and channel capacity are fixed exogenously in the SE and RI problems, respectively, the two environments lead to ...
متن کاملAn Introduction to Rational Inattention
• Another alternative – and this is the one that rational inattention chooses – is to model agents as having only a probability distribution over the true state of the world, instead of knowing the state of the world with certainty. For instance, imagine looking at a thermometer or yourwatch:While being – inmost cases, at least – highly correlated with the actual temperature or time, respective...
متن کاملRational Inattention and Aggregate Fluctuations
This paper introduces the rational inattention hypothesis (RI) – that agents process information subject to finite channel constraints – into a stochastic growth model with permanent technology shocks. We find that RI raises consumption volatility relative to output by introducing an endogenous demand shock. Furthermore, it is shown that incorporating RI can provide an additional internal propa...
متن کاملRational inattention in dynamic adverse selection
I analyze a market with asymmetric information, interdependent values, multiple trading opportunities and trade frictions. The frictions can be reduced at a cost, e.g. by increasing attention, search or computing power. Raising the difference between the values of buyers and sellers can delay trade, despite the greater gains from trade. Rejecting an initial offer is a stronger signal when the o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Monetary Economics
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0304-3932
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-3932(03)00029-1