Implications of limited investor attention to customer–supplier information transfers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Implications of limited investor attention to customer–supplier information transfers
This study focuses on the market reaction to information transfers from economically linked customers. I examine whether investors have limited attention with respect to the information contained in customer earnings announcements for suppliers. Using 1083 unique customer–supplier relationships for the period 1983–2011, I find that the cumulative abnormal returns of a supplier surrounding and f...
متن کاملImplications of Limited Investor Attention to Economic Links
This study focuses on the market reaction to information transfers from economically linked customers. In particular, I examine whether investors have limited attention with respect to the information contained in customer earnings announcements for suppliers. Using 1,083 unique customer-supplier relationships for the period 1983–2011, I find that the cumulative abnormal returns of a supplier s...
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Prior literature has documented that investor attention is associated with the pricing of stocks. We examine attention comovement, the extent to which investor attention for a firm is affected by attention paid to the industry and market in general. We find that attention comovement is positively related to comovement in firm fundamentals, and is also related to firm characteristics, such as si...
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Financial markets reveal information through which firm managers increase the value of equity, e.g., by improving investment decisions. With debt, however, such decisions are not necessarily socially efficient. We demonstrate that investors’ endogenous information acquisition, acting through this feedback channel, attenuates risk-shifting but amplifies debt overhang. The most ex-ante inefficien...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1062-9769
DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2014.02.003