Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Legal unbundling and auctions in vertically integrated (utilities) markets
This paper addresses the effectiveness of auctions and legal unbundling as regulatory measures to tender a vertically integrated industry more competitive. Specifically, I analyze if implementing auctions and legal unbundling can counter market power in an industry where a Vertically Integrated Corporation (VIC) has a monopoly position in an essential, scarce upstream activity and also owns one...
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We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream rms. Legal unbundling means that a downstream rm owns the upstream rm, but this upstream rm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream pro ts. We allow for non-tari¤ discrimination by the upstream rm and show that under quite general conditions legal unbund...
متن کاملMonopolistic Competition
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متن کاملUnbundling Ownership and Control∗
Treating control as an asset that can be bought and sold, we introduce a model of the simultaneous and separable trading of ownership and control in a private information setting. The model provides a novel explanation for the prevalence and persistence of the separation of ownership from control in modern corporations: efficiency in the market for corporate control is more easily achieved when...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Regulatory Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0922-680X,1573-0468
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-011-9144-5