Imperfect imitation can enhance cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Imperfect Imitation Can Enhance Cooperation
The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between both regimes, we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional imitation with another imi...
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We study a setting where imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoners’ Dilemma game. A well known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching: players that belong to a pair where both parties cooperate repeat partner next period whilst all other play...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: EPL (Europhysics Letters)
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0295-5075,1286-4854
DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/87/48005