Imperfect competition, concentration and growth with firm-specific R & D
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Economic Review
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0014-2921
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(94)e0072-7