Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Imperfect Competition and Corporate Governance¤
This paper studies corporate governance when a ̄rm faces imperfect competition. We derive ̄rms' decisions from utility maximisation by individuals. This reduces the usual monopoly distortion. We ̄nd that corporate governance can e®ect the equilibrium in the product (or input) markets. This enables us to endogenise the objective function of the ̄rm. If the ̄rm cannot commit not to change its con...
متن کاملCountry Portfolios with Imperfect Corporate Governance∗
Equity home bias is one of the most enduring puzzles in international finance. In this paper, I start out by documenting a novel stylized fact about home bias: countries with weaker domestic institutions hold fewer foreign assets. I then explore a macroeconomic mechanism by which the presence of agency problems in firms may explain this pattern. To do so, I develop a two-country dynamic stochas...
متن کاملCompetition and Corporate Governance in Transition
This paper examines the elements of institutional development critical to the enhancement of company performance in transition economies. This includes initial conditions, forms of privatization, institutional frameworks and the competitiveness of markets. Comparing empirical evidence, the paper concludes that there is a clear distinction in effectiveness of policies followed and their impact b...
متن کاملCompetition for Managers and Corporate Governance
Separation between CEO and Chairman of the Board is typically viewed as evidence of good corporate governance. Surprisingly, the literature has failed so far to uncover any significant relation between CEO/Chairman duality and firm performance. By distinguishing between periods with and without CEO turnover, we empirically identify two offsetting effects: the correlation between duality and per...
متن کاملCompetition for Managers, Corporate Governance and Incentive Compensation
We propose a model in which firms compete to attract better managers by using corporate governance as part of an optimal executive compensation scheme. Higher governance decreases the cost of taking disciplinary actions against managers, but when managerial talent is scarce, competition among firms to attract better managers implies that firms under-invest in governance. The reason is that mana...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00399.x