Impediments to universal preference-based default theories
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Impediments to Universal Preference-Based Default Theories
Research on nonmonotonic and default reasoning has identi ed several important criteria for preferring alternative default inferences. The theories of reasoning based on each of these criteria may uniformly be viewed as theories of rational inference, in which the reasoner selects maximally preferred states of belief. Though researchers have noted some cases of apparent con ict between the pref...
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Most formal theories of default inference have very poor computational properties, and are easily shown to be intractable, or worse, undecidable. We are therefore investigating limited but efficiently computable theories of default reasoning. This paper defines systems of Propositional Model-Preference Defaults, which provide a true modeltheoretic account of default inference with exceptions. T...
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Default systems based on the notion of “model-preference” have recently been proposed by Selman and Kautz to give a semantic account of the phenomena involved in default reasoning and to provide a formal justification for the limited cognitive load that default reasoning seems to require of human beings. In this paper we argue that the way these formal systems have been defined makes them inade...
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It is well-known that default reasoning and preference-based decision making both make use of preferential relations between possible worlds resp. alternatives. In this paper, we explore this methodological relationship in more detail by considering inference as a decision making problem. A foundational approach to preference fusion is used to define a nonmonotonic inference relation System ARS...
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An approach to nonmonotonic inference, based on preference orderings between possible worlds or states of affairs, is presented. We begin with an extant weak theory of default conditionals; using this theory, orderings on worlds are derived. The idea is that if a conditional such as “birds fly” is true then, all other things being equal, worlds in which birds fly are preferred over those where ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/0004-3702(91)90007-7