Impartial Evaluation under Ambiguity
نویسندگان
چکیده
How should an impartial social observer judge distributions of well-being across different individuals when there is uncertainty regarding the state world? I explore this question by imposing very weak conditions rationality and benevolent sympathy on betterness judgments under uncertainty. Although enough to be consistent with all main theories rationality, these prove sufficient rule out any heterogeneity in what good for individuals, require a neutral attitude part observer, that both individual strongly separable.
منابع مشابه
Portfolio Choice Under Ambiguity
This paper provides an intersection between portfolio choice theory and the elicitation of preferences under uncertainty. Theories of financial markets build on portfolio choice theory, which generally assumes that preferences are of a particularly simple kind, while research on preferences has revealed that people have more sophisticated preferences. This paper brings the two fields together b...
متن کاملDiversified Treatment under Ambiguity
This paper develops a broad theme about treatment under ambiguity through study of a particular decision criterion. The broad theme is that a planner may often want to cope with ambiguity by diversification, assigning observationally identical persons to different treatments. Study of the minimax-regret (MR) criterion substantiates the theme. The paper significantly extends my earlier analysis ...
متن کاملDynamic Choice under Ambiguity
This paper analyzes sophisticated dynamic choice for ambiguity-sensitive decision makers. It characterizes Backward Induction and a single-person version of Subgame Perfection via axioms on preferences over decision trees. Furthermore, it indicates how to elicit conditional preferences from prior preferences. The key axiom is a weakening of Dynamic Consistency, deemed Sophistication. The analys...
متن کاملImplementation under ambiguity
We introduce the idea of implementation under ambiguity. In particular, we study maximin efficient notions for an ambiguous asymmetric information economy (i.e., economies where agents’ preferences are maximin a la Wald [34]). The interest on the maximin preferences lies in the fact that maximin efficient allocations are always incentive compatible (de CastroYannelis [11]), a result which is fa...
متن کاملEfficient allocations under ambiguity
An important implication of the expected utility model under risk aversion is that if agents have the same probability belief, then the efficient allocations under uncertainty are comonotone with the aggregate endowment, and if their beliefs are concordant, then the efficient allocations are measurable with respect to the aggregate endowment. We study these two properties of efficient allocatio...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Ethics
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1539-297X', '0014-1704']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/718081