Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly
We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a là Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents’ previous output. Firms are allowed to make mistakes and deviate from the decision rules with a small probability. Appl...
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I present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly. Instead of assuming a homogeneous population of profit maximizing firms, the set of firms is divided into two subpopulations of either imitators or optimizers. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round. Optimizers are myopic best response players to the previous market output. The dynami...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2002
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.344720