Imagination as a generative source of justification

One of the most exciting debates in philosophy imagination recent years has been over epistemic use where epistemically contributes to justifying beliefs and acquiring knowledge. This paper defends “generationism about imagination” according which is a generative source, rather than preservative justification. In other words, generates new justification above beyond prior provided by sources. After clarifying generation/preservation distinction (Section 2), we present an argument for generationism imagination, can be divided into two parts; philosophical part empirical part. our 3), claim that follows from what call “INACCESSIBILITY”. According INACCESSIBILITY, properly constrained imaginative constrainers (i.e., representations constrain development scenario imagination) non-imaginative belief-forming processes do not have access. 4), INACCESSIBILITY plausible light relevant studies theories literature, especially literature on mental simulation 4.1), core cognition 4.2), intuitive physics 4.3).