منابع مشابه
Jin Cao: Illiquidity, Insolvency, and Banking Regulation Illiquidity, Insolvency, and Banking Regulation
This paper provides a compact framework for banking regulation analysis in the presence of uncertainty between systemic liquidity and solvency shocks. Extending the work by Cao & Illing (2009a, b), it is shown that systemic liquidity shortage arises endogenously as part of the inferior mixed strategy equilibrium. The paper compares different traditional regulatory policies which intend to fix t...
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There is an empirical connection between deposit insurance, risktaking, and insolvency. We argue that if banks maximize profit this amounts to a puzzle (even taking into account that deposit insurance decreases incentives for customers to monitor banks). However, we show that the empirical regularities can be well captured if bankers are motivated by reciprocity towards their customer base.
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During the contraction from 1929 to 1933, the Federal Reserve System tracked changes in the status of all banks operating in the United States and determined the cause of each bank suspension. This essay analyzes chronological patterns in aggregate series constructed from that data. The analysis demonstrates both illiquidity and insolvency were substantial sources of bank distress. Periods of h...
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The paper highlights gaps in key areas of legislation, regulation and supervision, standard-setting of Shari’ah-compliance and pinpoints areas where improvement is desirable to ensure stability in the Islamic banking and finance sector. The comparative analysis focuses on 11 selected Muslim countries (Malaysia, Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, Sudan, Kuwait, U.A.E ...
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We show that the regulation of bank lending practices is necessary for the optimal provision of private liquidity. In an environment in which bankers cannot commit to repay their creditors, we show that neither an unregulated banking system nor narrow banking can provide the socially e¢ cient amount of liquidity. If the bankers provided such an amount, then they would prefer to default on their...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2254512