II.—MORAL SENSE, MORAL REASON, AND MORAL SENTIMENT

Public Reason and Moral Bioenhancement

The Rawlsian model of public justification is proposed for the assessment of politics of moral enhancement, in alternative to the neo-republican model proposed in these debates by Robert Sparrow. The central idea of the Rawlsian model of public justification is represented by the liberal principle of legitimacy, although it is extended in relation to the domain that Rawls sees as proper for its...

Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason

In this paper we reply to the most important objections to our advocacy of moral enhancement by biomedical means - moral bioenhancement - that John Harris advances in his new book How to be Good. These objections are to effect that such moral enhancement undercuts both moral reasoning and freedom. The latter objection is directed more specifically at what we have called the God Machine, a super...

Emotion and Reason in Moral Judgment

A great deal of research in moral psychology has focused on the interplay between emotion and reason during moral judgment, characterizing the two as forces working in opposition to influence judgment. Below, we review recent psychological research on morality, with a special focus on disgust and the nature of its role in moral and political judgment. We review behavioral, neuroscience, and phy...

Reason and Intuition in the Moral Life: A Cognitivist Defense of Moral Intuitions

It is common in moral philosophy to appeal to so-called “moral intuitions” about cases as a means of building and defending moral theories. Intuitions are often taken as the starting point for theories, and intuitions are tested against moral theories until reflective equilibrium is achieved. The process of reflective equilibrium is supposed to provide rational justification for moral theories ...

Moral sentiment in judicial opinions on abortion.