I—Duncan Pritchard: Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Epistemic Luck
There has been a great deal of discussion in the recent literature regarding the supposed phenomenon of “epistemic luck.” This is the putative situation in which an agent gains knowledge even though that knowledge has come about in a way that has, in some sense to be specified, involved luck in some significant measure. Unfortunately, very little of the literature that deals with epistemic luck...
متن کاملExtended cognition and epistemic luck
When extended cognition is extended into mainstream epistemology, an awkward tension arises when considering cases of environmental epistemic luck. Surprisingly, it is not at all clear how the mainstream verdict that agents lack knowledge in cases of environmental luck can be reconciled with principles central to extended cognition.
متن کاملWittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo
We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book,Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supp...
متن کاملEpistemic Luck and the Extended Mind
Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal this commitment by taking for grant...
متن کاملEpistemic Value
The value turn has numerous motivations; I’ll discuss three of them. The first of these motivations consists in the ancient roots of the idea that epistemology is in some important way value-theoretic. Plato and Aristotle both took epistemic states such as knowledge and understanding to have particular and distinctive value. So too did their immediate and medieval followers (Zagzebski 2001). Th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0309-7013,1467-8349
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2008.00160.x