Identifying non-competitive bids in construction contract auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Omega
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0305-0483
DOI: 10.1016/s0305-0483(02)00057-9