Identification of Stochastic Sequential Bargaining Models
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models∗
Stochastic sequential bargaining models (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in different fields including political economy and macroeconomics due to their flexibility in explaining delays in reaching an agreement. This paper presents new results in nonparametric identification and estimation of such models under different data scenarios.
متن کاملIdentication of Stochastic Sequential Bargaining Models1
Stochastic sequential bargaining games (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in various elds including political economy and macroeconomics due to their exibility in explaining delays in reaching an agreement. In this paper, we present new results in nonparametric identi cation of such models under di¤erent scenarios of data availability. First, we give conditions for a...
متن کاملAntonio Merlo and Xun Tang “ Identification and Estimation of Stochastic Bargaining Models
Stochastic sequential bargaining models (Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998)) have found wide applications in different fields including political economy and macroeconomics due to their flexibility in explaining delays in reaching an agreement. This paper presents new results in nonparametric identification and estimation of such models under different data scenarios.
متن کاملSequential bargaining mechanisms
A fundamental problem in economics is determining how agreements are reached in situations where the parties have some market power. Of particular interest are questions of efficiency and distribution: • How efficient is the agreement? • How can efficiency be improved? • How are the gains from agreement divided among the parties? Here, I explore these questions in the context of bilateral monop...
متن کاملSequential bargaining and competition^
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model of a decentralised market. A main objective is to explore the conditions under which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the market game approximates the Walrasian outcome of the market. The three main messages that emerge from our results are as follows. First, contrary to conventional wisdom, frictionless markets need not be Walra...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1492217