منابع مشابه
All - Pay Contests ∗
The paper studies a class of games, “All-Pay Contests”, which captures general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying, competition for market power, labor-market tournaments, and R&D races. Players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score. Conditional on winning or losing, it is weakly better to do so with a lower score. This formulation a...
متن کاملAll-Pay Contests with Productive Effort
I consider competitions in which, conditional on winning or losing, the effort exerted by a competitor does not necessarily decrease his payoff. This happens, for example, in competitions for promotions in which workers are intrinsically motivated, and in research and development races in which better performance implies a higher payoff from winning. I characterize players’ equilibrium payoffs ...
متن کاملAsymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
This paper studies complete-information, all-pay contests with asymmetric players competing for multiple heterogeneous prizes. In these contests, each player chooses a performance level or score. The rst prize is awarded to the player with the highest score, the second, less valuable prize to the player with the second highest score, etc. Players are asymmetric in that they incur di¤erent co...
متن کاملMergers and collusion in all-pay auctions and crowdsourcing contests
We study the effects of bidder collaboration in all-pay auctions. We analyse both mergers, where the remaining players are aware of the agreement between the cooperating participants, and collusion, where the remaining players are unaware of this agreement. We examine two scenarios: the sum-profit model where the auctioneer obtains the sum of all submitted bids, and the max-profit model of crow...
متن کاملDifference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions
In much of the existing literature on rent-seeking games, the outcome of the contest is either infinitely sensitive or relatively insensitive to contestants’ efforts. The current paper presents a family of contest games that permit characterization of equilibrium for all levels of sensitivity of the outcome to contestants’ efforts. Specifically, the outcome of the contest depends on the differe...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180107