منابع مشابه
Humean Reductionism About Laws Of Nature
§0 Introduction By far the most central and important question about laws of nature is this: Are they mere patterns in the phenomena (patterns that are in some way salient, to be sure—but still, nothing more than patterns)? Or are they something more, something that somehow governs or constrains those phenomena? Disagreement over this issue constitutes the Schism in contemporary philosophical w...
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This paper attempts to develop a projectivistic understanding of chance or objective probability or partial determination. It does so by critically examining David Lewis’ philosophy of probability and his defense of Humean Supervenience, building thereupon the constructive projectivistic alternative, which will basically be a suitable reinterpretation of de Finetti’s position. Any treatment of ...
متن کاملHumean Dispositionalism
Humean metaphysics is characterised by a rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences. Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper I present a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that causal po...
متن کاملIn No Categorical Terms: A Sketch for an Alternative Route to a Humean Interpretation of Laws
Philosophers of science will be familiar with the ‘canonical’ debate in metaphysics over the modal status of natural laws. In this debate, the Humean faction adopts a world-view in which the fundamental properties are categorical, from which it follows that natural laws are metaphysically contingent. The AntiHumeans, on the other hand, adopt an account in which the fundamental properties are es...
متن کاملThe Humean Theory of Reasons
This paper offers a simple and novel motivation for the Humean Theory of Reasons. According to the Humean Theory of Reasons, all reasons must be explained by some psychological state of the agent for whom they are reasons, such as a desire. This view is commonly thought1 to be motivated by a substantive theory about the power of reasons to motivate known as reason internalism, and a substantive...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Principia: an international journal of epistemology
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1808-1711,1414-4247
DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p373