Hume, Causal Realism, and Causal Science
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Hume, Causal Realism, and Free Will
My aim in this paper is to present what I consider to be the decisive objection against the ‘New Hume’ Causal realist interpretation of Hume, and to refute three recent attempts to answer this objection. I start in §1 with an outline of the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ interpretations. Then §2 sketches the traditional case in favour of the former, while §3 presents the decisive objection to the latter, base...
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This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are often missed in discussions of epistemological arguments against realism. Then I define the target of the argument — non-causal realism — ...
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In this paper the connections between the nonconceptual content of perceptual states and realism are considered. In particular, I investigate the argument for realism that uses the notion of nonconceptual content, specifically the version proposed by Raftopoulos in Cognition and Perception. To evaluate the argument two forms of realism are identified: (1) correlation realism (CR), according to ...
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One plausible interpretation of Hume’s famous claim that “reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions” holds that desires are necessary to motivation, that beliefs alone cannot motivate. Now some have held, against Hume, that there are in fact beliefs which could motivate all by themselves—namely, beliefs about what is good. For there to be such beliefs then cognitivism about value—th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mind
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0026-4423,1460-2113
DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzp095