Human strategy updating in evolutionary games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games.
Evolutionary game dynamics describe not only frequency-dependent genetic evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update rules can have a crucial impact on evolutionary dynamics in theoretical models and, for example, can significantly alter the level of cooperation in social dile...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0027-8424,1091-6490
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0912515107