Hub and spoke trade agreements under oligopoly with asymmetric costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Effects of Hub-and-Spoke Free Trade Agreements on Trade: A Panel Data Analysis
— We use panel data consisting of 96 countries and covering the period 1960–2000 to investigate the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) and hub-and-spoke systems of FTA on exports. Our empirical results imply an annual growth rate of 5.57% in exports and hence a doubling of exports after 12.4 years between FTA partners. Non-overlapping FTAs account for 4.12%, while hub-andspoke FTAs account...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0963-8199,1469-9559
DOI: 10.1080/09638199.2012.665470