How Well Does the U.S. Social Insurance System Provide Social Insurance?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How Well Does the US Social Insurance System Provide Social Insurance?
This paper answers the question posed in the title within a model where agents receive idiosyncratic, wage-rate shocks that are privately observed. When the model social insurance system is comprised by the US social security and income tax system, then the maximum ex-ante welfare gain to improved insurance is equivalent to a 12.3 percent increase in consumption. We determine the reasons behind...
متن کاملHow Well Does the Australian Aged Pension Provide Social Insurance?
Social security plays an essential role in an economy, but if designed incorrectly can distort the labor supply and savings behavior of individuals in the economy. We explore how well the Australian means-tested pension system provides social insurance by calculating possible welfare gains from changing the settings in the current means-tested pension system. This work has been explored by othe...
متن کاملSocial Norms in Social Insurance
We analyze how insurance arrangements, labor supply, moral hazard and outright cheating are affected by social norms. One question is under what conditions norms may improve social welfare. Another is under what conditions people should be allowed to opt out of social insurance. We introduce an informal production sector to analyze the consequences of alternative assumptions about the informati...
متن کاملPolitically sustainable social insurance
Private information underpins a basic social trade-off between incentives and inequality. Normative models of dynamic incentive provision explore the optimal evolution of this trade-off. Many prescribe relentlessly increasing levels of inequality. Indeed, under a variety of standard preference assumptions, an immiseration result obtains: a privileged measure zero set of agents obtain all resour...
متن کاملPolitically Credible Social Insurance
This paper considers political credibility of allocations in settings with dynamic private information. It embeds a benchmark dynamic moral environment into political economy games which feature repeated voting over mechanisms. Optimal politically credible allocations are shown to solve virtual planning problems with social discount factors in excess of the private one. JEL codes: C73, D72, D82...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/651513