How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts
Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article in...
متن کاملEric Schwitzgebel How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience ?
Philosophers tend to assume that we have excellent knowledge of our own current conscious experience or ‘phenomenology’. I argue that our knowledge of one aspect of our experience, the experience of visual imagery, is actually rather poor. Precedent for this position is found among the introspective psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two main arguments are advan...
متن کاملHow can we know if patients in coma, vegetative state or minimally conscious state are conscious?
This paper examines the claim that patients in coma, vegetative state and minimally conscious state may in fact be conscious. The topic is of great importance for a number of reasons--not least ethical. As soon as we know a given creature has any experiences at all, our ethical attitude towards it changes completely. A number of recent experiments looking for signs of intact or partially intact...
متن کاملHow We Know Our Senses
I propose a new criterion by which, I hold, subjects recognize and distinguish their sensory modalities. I argue that, rather than appealing to one of the standard criteria (sense organ, proximal stimulus, phenomenal character, or representational content (Grice 1962, Macpherson 2011a)) or to O’Dea’s (2011) proprioceptive content, we need to introduce the criterion of location in the functional...
متن کاملHow Velmans’ Conscious Experiences Affected Our Brains
In an appendix Velmans gives his reasons for refusing to resolve these problems through adopting the position (which he labels ‘physicalism’) that ‘consciousness is nothing more than a state of the brain’. The rest of the paper, then, is an attempt to solve these problems without embracing a reductionist physicalism. Velmans’ solution to the first problem is ‘ontological monism combined with ep...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0140-525X,1469-1825
DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x09000636