How to Improve the Supply of Quasi-Public Forest Infrastructure When Government Is the Leader: Evidence from Experimental Economics

Forest infrastructure is an important material basis for healthy forests. According to public goods theory, most forest infrastructures are quasi-public goods, with demand exceeding supply, more than one supplier, unclear responsibilities between suppliers, and a resultant free-rider problem. This study explored ways improve the supply of when government—as leader—cooperates foresters—as followers. Experimental economics were used explain factors that influence behaviour suppliers; design twelve policy scenarios by communication, information feedback, rewards punishments, leadership styles; simulate changes in foresters’ different analyse which policies conducive improving infrastructures. The results as follows: style reduce free-riding behaviour; rewards, punishment increase and, furthermore, scenario 1.792–4.616 times situation without punishment; constraints punishment, only feedback reduces supply; p values Mann–Whitney U test on level all greater 0.05, indicates no significant difference exists leading words example improvement. When foresters able communicate each other, reward exist, provided; hence, higher regardless whether government leads or example. provided suggestions how forestry infrastructure, namely, organizer should organize fully negotiate before raising funds construction; publish, appropriate, income foresters; formulate appropriate measures.