How to Assign Scarce Resources Without Money: Designing Information Systems that are Efficient, Truthful, and (Pretty) Fair

Matching with preferences has great potential to coordinate the efficient allocation of scarce resources in organizations when monetary transfers are not available. It is well known that it impossible combine all three properties truthfulness, efficiency, and fairness (i.e., envy freeness) matching preferences. Established mechanisms either or free, efficiency loss envy-free substantial. We focus on a widespread representative problem: course assignment where students have for courses organizers priorities over students. An important feature maximum capacity minimum required quota. This also requirement many other applications, such as school choice, hospital-residents matching, workers jobs. introduce RESPCT, mechanism respects quotas truthful, efficient, low levels envy. The reduction significant due two remarkably effective heuristics. provide analytical experimental results based field data from large-scale application. These led policy change proposed system now being used match hundreds every semester.