How structural adjustment programs affect inequality: A disaggregated analysis of IMF conditionality, 1980–2014

Evaluation of Structural Conditionality in Imf-supported Programs

IMF Conditionality

This paper presents a principal-agent model of IMF conditional lending, in the aftermath of a “capital-account” liquidity crisis. We show that traditional ex-post conditionality can be e¤ective in safeguarding the Fund’s resources, allowing for the provision of e¢cient emergency lending and reducing ine¢cient ex-ante credit rationing if the capital out‡ow which triggers the crisis is not excess...

IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty

Sovereign Debt , Structural Adjustment , and Conditionality 1

The lack of proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a result, a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports. Conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure. Formalizing this argument, we show that conditionality helps ...

Imf Conditionality as a Screening Device*

A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has su¢cient resources to engage i...