How rating agencies achieve rating stability
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
RATING AGENCIES Harold Cole
For decades credit rating agencies were viewed as trusted arbiters of creditworthiness and their ratings as important tools for managing risk. The common narrative is that the value of ratings was compromised by the evolution of the industry to a form where issuers pay for ratings. In this paper we show how credit ratings have value in equilibrium and how reputation insures that, in equilibrium...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Banking & Finance
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0378-4266
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.06.006